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CORPORATIONS
I. SERvicE oF PAPmEs oN CoRpoRATE DEFENDANT
Two of the five cases worthy of note in the corporations area,
Lott 'v. Claussens, Inc.1 and Burs Chemical, Inc. v. DanieZ Con-
struction Co.,2 dealt with service of process under Section 10-421
of the South Carolina Code.3
A. -What Constitutes "Owming Property"?
Lott v. Claussens, Inc. was an action to recover for personal in-
juries sustained in a collision in Barnwell County with one of
the trucks of defendant bakery corporation. The sole question be-
fore the supreme court was whether Claussens owned property
in Barnwell County. In its motion for change of venue, Claus-
sens admitted that it did business in the county but denied owner-
ship of property there. The court affirmed the lower court's de-
cision that the ownership of a contractual right to use certain dis-
play racks to sell its products in Barnwell County constituted
ownership of property in the county for venue purposes.
In the Burms case the court held that the presence at its con-
struction site of a mobile trailer office and other equipment
owned by defendant corporate builder was sufficient to meet the
property ownership requirements of the section.
A sampling of prior South Carolina cases in which a similar
question arose reveals the following: The test of ownership of
property was not met by owning a truck in which corporate prod-
ucts were sold or delivered to the county where the action was
brought from another county;4 a motion to change venue was
overruled in a tort action against a domestic corporation engaged
in the manufacture and delivery of bakery products, where the
1. 251 S.C. 478, 163 S.E2d 615 (1968).
2. 251 S.C. 483, 163 S.E2d 618 (1968).
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-421 (Supp. 1968) provides:
If the suit be against a corporation, the summons shall, except as
otherwise expressly provided, be served by delivering a copy
thereof to the president or other head of the corporation, or to
the secretary, cashier or treasurer or any director or agent thereof;
prozdded, further, that, in the case of domestic or foreign corpora-
tions, service as effected under the terms of this section shall be
effective and confer jurisdiction over any domestic or foreign
corporation in any county where such domestic or foreign corpora-
tion shall own property and transact business, regardless of
whether or not such foreign or domestic corporation maintains
an office or has agents in that county.
4. Brown v. Palmetto Baking Co., 220 S.C. 38, 66 S.E.2d 417 (1951).
1
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corporation had three salesmen residing in the county where the
action was brought, each having his own delivery truck with the
name of the salesman as "agent" printed on it. 5 The Lott opin-
ion distinguished the holding of Hopkins v. Sun Crest Bottling
Co.,(which was that the temporary presence of bottles and crates
did not constitute "property" within the statute.
The court was especially impressed by the following from
Gibbes v. Nationad Hospital Service, Ine.7 :
The term "property" is, in law, a generic term of exten-
sive application. It is a term of large import, of broad
and exceedingly complex meaning, of the broadest and
most extensive signification, a very comprehensive
word, and is the most comprehensive of all terms which
can be used. The term is often called "nomen general-
issiaum," and is employed to signify any valuable right
or interest protected by law, and the subject matter or
things in which rights or interest exist.8
The Gibbes opinion, along with Peeples v. Orkin Eoteminat-
ing Co.,O recognized contract rights as "property" within the
meaning of the instant section of the code. By minimizing the
property-ownership requirement of Section 10-421, cases like Lott
clearly ease the plaintiff's chore of pinning down the corporate
presence.
B. What Constitutes "Agency"9?
The Buris case was concerned with whether delivery of a
copy of the summons to defendant builder's superintendent in
charge of fifteen men completing construction of a factory and
acting as general superintendent constituted service on an "agent"
within the meaning of Section 10-421. The supreme court held
that the superintendent was such an agent. The court cautioned
that the question was not whether the employee was conducting
corporate business so as to make the company a resident of the
county for venue purposes, but simply whether he was an agent
for service within the meaning of Section 10-421.
Justice Littlejohn pointed out that the purpose of Section 10-
421 is to give the corporation notice of the proceedings against it.
5. Morris v. Peoples Baking Co., 191 S.C. 501, 5 S.E.2d 286 (1939).
6. 228 S.C. 287, 89 S.E.2d 755 (1955).
7. 202 S.C. 304, 24 S.E.2d 513 (1944).
8. Id. at 308, 24 S.E.2d at 515, quoting 50 C.J. Property §2 (1930).
9. 244 S.C. 173, 135 S.E.2d 845 (1964).
[Vol. 21
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Evidence supported the finding that service of process upon the
superintendent could reasonably have been expected to result in
prompt notice to the corporation, thus providing an adequate
opportunity to defend.
C. What Constitutes "Transacting Business"?
The court in BurrIs further commented on the issue of whether
defendant, not having completed its project in the county where it
was served, was "transacting business" within the meaning of the
statute. Holding that it was, Justice Littlejohn distinguished two
prior cases'0 saying that both dealt with isolated acts of solicita-
tion of advertising or occasional deliveries within the particular
counties and were not analogous to a prolonged construction pro-
ject as here. He pointed to Atkinson v. Korn Idustries, Inc.11
which held a single logging contract to be "transacting business"
when such was - as the activity relied on for the element of
"transacting business" must always be - part of its usual or ordi-
nary business and continuous in the sense of being distinguish-
able from merely casual, occasional, or isolated transactions.
II. NoN-PROFIT CoRPoRATIONS AND THE BusiNss
CoRoR oTION AcT
In Columbia Country Club v. Livingston,'2 the Columbia
Country Club had brought suit to recover an amount assessed by
the South Carolina Tax Commission for certain alleged admis-
sion charges. The intricacies'3 of the tax statute involved led the
Tax Commission into the remarkable argument that, though the
club was concededly organized and operated as a non-profit cor-
poration, the passage of the Business Corporation Act of 196214
automatically converted it into a profit corporation. The "pur-
pose" clauses of the club's charter and by-laws had not been
amended since its incorporation in 1945. It had operated accord-
inging to its by-laws: "without profit." The Tax Commission
nevertheless contended that the club "exists [like any other corpo-
ration] by operation of law, and by operation of law is defined
as a profit corporation and such is conclusive. It was prohibited
from offering any evidence that would tend to establish its
10. Seegars v. WIS-TV, 236 S.C. 355, 114 S.E.2d 502 (1960); Thomas &
Howard Co. v. Marion Lumber Co., 232 S.C. 304, 101 S.F2d 848 (1958).
11. 219 S.C. 402, 65 S.E.2d 465 (1951).
12. 167 S.E.2d 300 (S.C. 1969).
13. Discussed in the Survey of Taxation, infra at 656.
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character otherwise and the evidence and testimony submitted
for such purposes was inadmissible."'15 The court dismissed the
argument, pointing out that the definition may be enough to
create a legal presumption or implication, but such wouZd be re-
buttable.
The supreme court found authority for its position in an an-
notation:
The purpose for which a corporation has been organized
is a question of fact, to be determined from all the evi-
dence, including statements in the charter and evidence
concerning the circumstances surrounding its organiza-
tion, the purposes and intentions of of the incorporators,
and the activities of the corporation and of any pre-
decessor organization.' 6
The Business Corporation Act provided that the new statutes
should not affect the existence of corporations existing on Jan-
uary 1, 196, the date the act took effect, and any corporation, its
shareholders, directors, and officers should have the same rights
and be subject to the same limitations, restrictions, liabilities and
penalties which apply to corporations organized thereafter.'
The court pointed out that since the date of its effectiveness
the exclusive statutory authority for the organization of a non-
profit corporation of this character has been the Business Corpo-
ration Act, and the act provides that the by-laws may contain
any provision not inconsistent with law or the articles of incorpo-
ration, for the regulation and management of the business af-
fairs of the corporation.' 8
That particular statement does not mesh with other interpreta-
tions of the South Carolina Business Corporation Act. Mr.
William H. Blackwell has observed that
[a]s its name implies, the act applies only to "business
corporations," both foreign and domestic. Eleemosynary
or non-profit corporations are not affected.19
Walter J. Bristow concluded:
It should be borne in mind that the new law is a busi-
15. 167 S.E.2d 300, 303 (S.C. 1969).
16. Id., quoting Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 871, 879 (1960).
17. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-11.3 (Supp. 1968).
18. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-16.1 (Supp. 1968).
19. Blackwell, General Provisions and Corporate Purposes and Powers,
Syntposium of South Carolina Corporation Law, 15 S.C.L. Rxv. 444 (1963).
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ness corporation law. This is made plain not only by the
title of the act, but even more so by section 1.3, relating
to the application of the act, and section 2.1, relating to
corporate purposes. Thus the act does not apply to
charitable, social or religious corporations, or other elee-
mosynary corporations. So far as the organization of
corporations under the act is concerned, it is specifically
provided in section 4.1(a) that a corporation may be
organized for "any lawful business." If the proposed
organization is not to conduct a business, then it should
not be organized under the act.
20
These comments seem to be more in line with the purposes of
the act reflected in the Reporter's Notes to the applicable sec-
tions, but do not necessarily affect the accuracy of the court's
statement or its decision. The comments and the Reporter's Notes
seem directed toward the sections which provide for the creation
of eleemosynary corporations which do not issue stock.21 The
Columbia County Club had issued stock, but fell within the cat-
egory of "non-profit" since its incorporation occurred prior to
the passage of the act.22
III. PROBLEMS OF CORPORATENESS
Dargan v. Graves,23 an action for accounting, arose after the
failure of a skeleton corporation. In 1954 or earlier Graves and
Dargan entered the construction field. Their pact arose because
Dargan, a lumber manufacturer, wanted to obtain the services of
Graves, an experienced builder. For the first phase of their oper-
ation Graves drew a salary and expenses, and was to receive
a part of the net profits. In 1959 they began doing business as
Coastal Development Corporation and in 1960 they incorporated
as Coastal Development Company of Conway, Inc. When the
venture failed, each party sought an accounting from the other.
The master found that the corporation had earned profits, that
Graves was due 50% of them, and that, though a corporate char-
ter had been issued, Dargan had conducted the business as if it
were his own personal proprietorship and should be held per-
sonally liable for the amount due Graves. Dargan contended that
20. Bristow, Organization of Corporations, Symposium of South Carolina
Corporation Law, 15 S.C.L. Rev. 346 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
21. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-751, -752, and -753 (Supp. 1968).
22. For a general discussion of the non-profit corporation and its problems,
see H. OLECK, NoN-PROFIT CORPORATIONS AND AssoclTroNs (1956).
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the entry of a personal judgment against him was error since the
profits involved were earned not by him but by the corporation
operating under a valid corporate charter. Thus liability for such
profits should be confined to the corporation.
The supreme court found it unnecessary to examine the effic-
acy of the corporate shell, yet it did pause to note that some real
business transactions had been conducted by the corporation.
Certain real estate and stock had been transferred to it; a bank
account was maintained and checks with the corporate name
printed thereon were issued against the account, signed, "Coastal
Development Company of Conway, Inc. By: 0. C. Graves, Jr."
Yet no corporate stock had been issued as planned, no meetings
ever held, and no officers elected.
Having noted all this, the court found it unnecessary to go
further. The facts showed that Graves was estopped from deny-
ing the valid existence of the corporation for the purpose of hold-
ing Dargan personally liable. The court stated:
This is in accord with the rule that a member or stock-
holder of a pretended corporation is estopped to deny the
valid existence of the corporation for the purpose of
holding the other stockholders or members personally
liable on contracts entered into by them in carrying on
the corporate business.
24
One of the purposes of the Business Corporation Act was to do
away with many of the knotty problems of de jure and de facto
incorporation.25 The Coastal Development Company of Conway,
Inc. was incorporated prior to enactment of the new act, but the
Reporter's Notes convincingly point out that the statute which
Section 12-14.5 replaces26 likewise implied that corporate exist-
ence began when the secretary issued the charter:
24, Id. at 310.
25. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-14.5 (Supp. 1968) provides:ja) The existence of the corporation shall begin as of the filing
ate of the articles of incorporation, that is to say, as of the date
endorsed by the Secretary of State upon the original filed copy of
these articles of incorporation, as provided by § 12-11.6.
(b) The fact that the articles of incorporation have been filed with
the Secretary of State shall be conclusive evidence that all condi-
tions required by chapters 1.1 to 1.14 of this Title to be performed
by the incorporators have been complied with, that the corporate
existence has begun, except when the State shall institute pro-
ceedings to
(1) Cancel or revoke the articles of incorporation;
(2) Enjoin any person from acting as a corporation within this
State without being duly incorporated; or
(3) Compel dissolution of the corporation.
26. S.C. CODE AwN. § 12-59 (1962).
[Vol. 21
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Upon the filing of the declaration and receipt of the
charter fee the Secretary of State shall issue to the in-
corporators a certified copy of their declaration which
shall constitute the charter of the corporation author-
izing it to begin business under the name and for the
purposes indicated in the written declaration.
27
The new statute merely pinpoints the exact moment when cor-
porate existence begins and states who may challenge the validity
of the incorporation.
The rule enunciated by the court in Dargan, however, deals
with defective incorporations. The facts of the decision do not
reveal in what respect, if any, the corporation was defective.28
But even if it were defective in some respect, the decision seems
to be correct. Certainly the cited rule is the majority rule and the
one preferred by the authorities.
In essence where one has participated actively as an officer or
director of a defectively organized corporation, he and his rep-
resentatives are estopped to deny its valid existence for the pur-
pose of holding the stockholders or other members liable to con-
tribution as partners, or for the purpose of holding them per-
sonally liable on contracts made by him with the corporation.
A question might arise under S.C. CODE A.NN. § 12-14.6 (Supp.
1968) as to whether or not a corporation was authorized to do
business by reason of not having paid in the minimum capital re-
quired. The rule in such a case seems to be that, although the
statute imposes joint and several liability on any person who has
participated in a violation of the statute by doing business before
that requirement, among others, is met, the statute does not make
participants liable for all the debts of the corporation, but only
those arising from their dereliction of duty.29 It should be noted
that piercing the corporate veil, or disregarding the corporate
entity, is still permissible in the event of fraud, great injustice,
or illegality, but none of these appear in the present case.
27. Id.
28. See generally S. C. CODE ANN. § 12-14.5 (Supp. 1968). The new statute
says specifically that the filing of articles is conclusive evidence of incorpora-
tion. If one relies on the statute, it is not necessary to look to the "corporation
by estoppel" theory which should only come into play if the corporation is
defective in some way. See, e.g., Robertson v. Levy, 197 A.2d 443 (1964),
noted in 43 N.C.L. Ray. 209 (1964).
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IV. SToo DIoMSms' MMIGS
The year's most intriguing question was raised by the case of
Rogers 'v. First National Bank.30 This was a class action brought
by stockholders to determine the validity of a proposed bank
merger. The federal district court held that the plaintiffs, all of
whom voted against merger and represented less than the one-
third of outstanding shares necessary to block merger, had no
standing to complain about or take advantage of alleged irregu-
larities in the stockholders' meeting. "[Oinly the shareholders
whose votes were counted in favor of the merger can now be
heard to complain about . . . the alleged irregularities in the
stockholders meeting .... 131
Among the irregularities asserted were: no record date was
fixed for establishing which shareholders were entitled to vote;
proxies were voted without being executed by the shareholder
himself; and proxies were voted without being dated. The court
agreed that such irregularities would violate the South Carolina
Business Corporation Act if it were applicable. But the court
held that state law does not apply to the merger proceedings in
question. Involved are national banking corporations chartered
under federal law. Their merger is therefore governed and con-
trolled by federal statutes and regulations.
The district court conceded that if the plaintiffs were correct
in their contention that state law applies to the merger proceed-
ings when not in direct conflict with the federal statutes, the
shareholders' election was indeed invalid. Unable to find any
cases on point -the opinion was written without a single cita-
tion-the court decided to extend its temporary restraining
order long enough for plaintiffs to appeal the decision.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed.82 Chief Judge Haynsworth found it unnecessary to
decide whether state corporation law might supplement federal
bank merger legislation when the two are not in conflict. South
Carolina law requires that proxies be dated;3 3 federal law re-
quires only that proxies be "duly authorized in writing."34 The ill
30. 297 F. Supp. 641 (D.S.C. 1969).
31. Id. at 646.
32. Rogers v. First National Bank, 410 F.2d 579 (1969).
33. S.C. ConE ANN. § 12-16.14(c) (Supp. 1968):
No proxy shall be valid after the expiration of eleven months
from the date of its execution. Every proxy shall be dated as of
its execution, and no proxy shall be undated or postdated.
34. 12 U.S.C. § 61 (1964).
[Vol. 21
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sought to be cured by the South Carolina law was "the voting of a
general proxy over a prolonged period."35 Since the proxies were
addressed specifically to the merger question and could have been
no more than two months old, the statute, even if applicable, was
not violated. Another contention of plaintiffs was that contrary
to the statute3 6 no record date more than ten days prior to the
meeting was set by the board of directors for determining those
eligible to vote. The court held this to be in conflict with the
federal provisions: 3 7 "We find . . . an intention on the part of
Congress to permit a bank desiring to merge to select any date,
including the date of voting, as the record date.13  The state law,
being not merely supplemental to but in conflict with the federal
requirements, may not be applied.
V. NEw LEGIsLATiON
Several special acts were passed authorizing the Secretary of
State to restore charters to certain named corporations. The ef-
fect of these acts is to make the new Business Corporation Act
applicable to these companies.
S.C. CoDE ANw. § 12-18.6 (Supp. 1968) was amended to further
provide for the filling of vacancies, however occurring, on the
board of directors of business corporations. The amendment
omits a part of the old statute requiring that vacancies created by
an increase in the authorized number be filled only by the share-
holders at a special meeting or at the annual meeting. This section
was designed to prevent the current directors from packing the
board. The new statute allows such a vacancy to be filled (until
the next annual meeting) by the current board or by a special
meeting of shareholders. Thus, packing could occur temporarily
unless such a special meeting is called; yet the filling of the
vacancy, which might be vital to the existence of the corporation,
may take place expeditiously without calling a special meeting
of all the stockholders.
35. 410 F.2d at 582.
36. S.C. CODE Axx. § 12-16.6(a) (Supp. 1968).
37. 12 U.S.C. § 215(a) (1964).
38. 410 F2d at 582. The court also rejected the argument that stock held
by a father as natural guardian for his children could not be voted by him
alone in view of his failure to register guardianship under the Uniform Gifts
to Minors Act, S. C. CODE ANt. §§ 62-401 to -411 (1962). According to the
court this act "was designed to meet other problems, not to restrict the voting
powers of fiduciaries with respect to stock registered in the name of the
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S.C. CODE. ANN. §§ 12-20.1 to -20.2 (Supp. 1968) relating to the
authority of domestic corporations to merge or consolidate were
amended to provide for the manner of converting shares of each
corporation involved. The distinction between the two types of
amalgamation - consolidation and merger - which are often
confused, is pointed out in the Reporter's Notes accompanying
the act. This and subsequent sections of the act are the necessary
legislative grants of authority needed before any merger can
legitimately take place, and must be closely followed. The sta-
tutes as amended make it clear that a plan of merger, promul-
gated by the board of directors, may provide for the conversion
of shares into shares, securities, or obligations, not only of the
new corporation but also the parent or subsidiary of the new
corporation. This change permits one of the participating corp-
orations to continue its existence after the merger or consolida-
tion while the old statute did not.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-103.1 (1962) relating to the number of
shares one must own to be eligible for election as director of a
bank was amended to clarify the applicability of the statute (it
applies to banking corporations organized under South Carolina
Law), to delete the requirements of stock ownership for managers
and trustees of the bank, and to change the stockholding require-
ments for a director to the ownership of unencumbered stock in
the bank of the aggregate value of five hundred dollars. The new
provisions require the ownership of the qualifying shares to be
in shares of the parent if the bank is a subsidiary corporation.
S.C. CODE. ANN. § 8-125 (1962) relating to merger, consolida-
tion, and transfer of assets of banks and trust companies was
amended to include those organized under federal laws such as
the National Banking Act. The statute as amended provides that
"all applicable laws" relative to such actions first be complied
with. The selling and transferring of assets of such a bank or
company is newly included in the provisions. The amendment
makes it clear that liability will shift to the resultant or trans-
feree organization on the effective date of the transaction. Sim-
ilarly, it is provided all rights and interests, real and personal,
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